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Abstract. Despite the enthusiastic rhetoric about the so called collec-
tive intelligence, conspiracy theories – e.g. global warming induced by
chemtrails or the link between vaccines and autism – find on the Web a
natural medium for their dissemination. Users preferentially consume in-
formation according to their system of beliefs and the strife within users
of opposite narratives may result in heated debates. In this work we pro-
vide a genuine example of information consumption from a sample of 1.2
million of Facebook Italian users. We show by means of a thorough quan-
titative analysis that information supporting different worldviews – i.e.
scientific and conspiracist news – are consumed in a comparable way by
their respective users. Moreover, we measure the effect of the exposure to
4709 evidently false information (satirical version of conspiracy theses)
and to 4502 debunking memes (information aiming at contrasting un-
substantiated rumors) of the most polarized users of conspiracy claims.
We find that either contrasting or teasing consumers of conspiracy nar-
ratives increases their probability to interact again with unsubstantiated
rumors.
Keywords: misinformation, collective narratives, crowd dynamics, in-
formation spreading.
1 Introduction
The large availability of data from online social networks (OSN) allows for the
study of mass social dynamics at an unprecedented level of resolution. Along this
path, recent studies have pointed out several important results in the emerging
field of computational social science [1,2] ranging from the influence-based conta-
gion, up to the emotional contagion, passing through the virality of false claims
[3,4,5]. In particular in [5,6] it has been shown that massive digital misinforma-
tion permeates online social dynamics. Social interaction, healthcare activity, po-
litical engagement and economic decision-making are influenced by digital hyper-
connectivity – i.e. the increasing and exponential rate at which people, processes
and data are connected and interdependent [7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16]. Every-
one can produce and access a variety of information actively participating in the
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diffusion and reinforcement of narratives. Such a process has been dubbed as col-
lective intelligence [17,18]. However, despite the enthusiastic rhetoric about the
ways in which digital technologies have burst the interest in debating political or
social relevant issues, their role in enforcing informed debates and shaping the
public opinion still remain unclear. Indeed, the World Economic Forum listed
massive digital misinformation as one of the main risks for the modern soci-
ety [19]. Conspiracy theories as alternative explanations to complex phenomena
(e.g., globalization or climate change) find on the Web a natural medium for
their dissemination and, not rarely, they are used as argumentation for policy
making and foment collective debates [20]. Conspiracy theses tend to reduce the
complexity of reality by explaining significant social or political aspects as plots
conceived by powerful individuals or organizations. Since these kinds of argu-
ments can sometimes involve the rejection of science, alternative explanations
are invoked to replace the scientific evidence. For instance, people who reject
the link between HIV and AIDS generally believe that AIDS was created by the
U.S. Government to control the African American population [21]. The spread
of misinformation in such trusted networks can be particularly difficult to detect
and correct because of the social reinforcement – i.e. people are more likely to
trust an information originating from within their network or someway consis-
tent with their system of beliefs [22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,15,33]. Since
unsubstantiated claims are proliferating over the Internet, what would happen
if they were used as the basis for policy making? Such a scenario makes cru-
cial the quantitative understanding of the social determinants related to content
selection, information consumption, and beliefs formation and revision. Misin-
formation is pervasive and as a first reaction we noticed the emergence of blogs
and pages devoted to debunk false claims, namely hoaxbusters. Meanwhile, the
strong polarization of users with respect to one or another narrative (fomented
by the possibility to ban and to write negative comments) triggered the prolifer-
ation of satirical pages producing demential imitation of conspiracy theses (e.g.,
chemtrails containing sildenafil citratum – i.e. the active ingredient of ViagraTM–
or the political action committee to abolish the thermodynamic laws), namely
trolls. In this work we provide a genuine example of robust generative patterns
about information consumption on the Italian Facebook on a sample of 1.2
million of individuals. In particular, we show, through a thorough quantitative
analysis, similar consumption patterns of information supporting different (and
opposite) worldviews. Then, we measure the social response of polarized users
of alternative news to 4709 satirical version of conspiracy theses and to 4502
debunking memes (information aiming at correcting the diffusion of unsubstan-
tiated claims) for increasing level of user commitment on the preferred narra-
tives (scientific news and conspiracy news). We find that, for polarized users of
conspiracy-like claims the exposure to either debunking or parody of conspiracy
claims, the survival probability – i.e. the probability to continue consuming posts
related to conspiracy – increases with the user’s commitment in the narrative.
2 Data Collection
We want to characterize information consumption patterns of users with respect
to the different and heterogeneous information belonging to different narratives.
In order to define the space of our investigation, we were helped by Facebook
groups very active in the debunking of conspiracy theses (see acknowledgments
section). The resulting dataset is composed of 73 public Facebook pages divided
in scientific news and conspiracist news for which we downloaded all the posts
(and their respective users interactions) in a timespan of 4 years (2010 to 2014).
Furthermore, we consider also 6 pages very active in debunking conspiracy in-
formation, namely hoax-busters, and 2 pages satirizing conspiracy theories by
diffusing intentional false information as a satirical imitation of conspiracy the-
ses. These latter have produced information that went viral despite their evident
satirical taste. Among these, the OGM yellow tomatoes and the violet carrots
created by industries to satisfy aesthetic needs (notice that the first tomatoes
arrived in Europe were yellow) or the wonderful anti-hypnotic effects of lemon
(such a post received more than 45.000 shares). The entire data collection process
is performed exclusively with the Facebook Graph API [34], which is publicly
available and which can be used through one’s personal Facebook user account.
The exact breakdown of the data is presented in Table 1. The first category
includes all pages diffusing conspiracist information – pages which disseminate
controversial information, most often lacking supporting evidence and sometimes
contradictory of the official news. The second category is that of scientific dis-
semination including scientific institutions and scientific press having the main
mission to diffuse scientific knowledge. We focus our analysis on the interaction
of users with the public posts – i.e. likes, shares, and comments. Each of these
actions has a particular meaning. A like stands for a positive feedback to the
post; a share expresses the will to increase the visibility of a given information;
and comment is the way in which online collective debates take form. Comments
may contain negative or positive feedbacks with respect to the post.
Total Science Conspiracy Hoaxbusters Troll
Pages 81 34 39 6 2
Posts 271, 296 62, 705 208, 591 4, 502 4, 709
Likes 9, 164, 781 2, 505, 399 6, 659, 382 67, 324 40, 341
Comments 1, 017, 509 180, 918 836, 591 17, 883 58, 686
Unique Comments 279, 972 53, 438 226, 534 5, 115 42, 910
Unique Likes 1, 196, 404 332, 357 864, 047 12, 427 16, 833
Table 1. Breakdown of Facebook dataset. The number of pages, posts, comments
and likes for all category of pages.
3 Results and Discussion
3.1 On the fruition of distinct narratives
We start our analysis by characterizing information consumption patterns by
focusing on the behavior of usual consumers of conspiracy and scientific news.
Through a thresholding strategy we select the most active users in a specific
category according to their liking activity on posts. As we assume likes to be
positive feedbacks with respect to the information reported on the post [35], a
user is labeled as polarized in one category if the 95% of his likes is given on posts
published on pages of such a category. Through this classification algorithm we
are able to label 255, 225 users polarized in science and 790, 899 users polarized
in conspiracy. As a first level of approximation of the users interaction patterns
we focus on the temporal dimension of the users persistence on one or the other
category. In Figure 1 we show the empirical complementary cumulative distribu-
tion function (CCDF) of the users’ persistence rate, namely r, intended as the
mean time interval (in hours) between likes of a user on posts of their preferred
narrative. Mean and median for Science are, respectively, 1212 and 513 hours.
Mean and median for Conspiracy are, respectively, 1155 and 665 hours. Usual
consumers of conspiracy and scientific news present a very similar interaction
with the posts.
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Fig. 1. Fruition Patterns: Empirical CCDF of the mean time interval (in hours)
between likes for each user. The two distributions are indicating a similar behavior in
the rate of persistence of the users.
We zoom in at the level of the users’ lifetime in the category on which they
are assigned to. In Figure 2 it is shown the CCDF of users’ lifetime, namely l –
i.e., the time interval (in hours) between the first and the last like of the users
on posts of the category which they are assigned to. Mean and median user’s
lifetime for Science are, respectively, 6976 and 4126 hours; mean and median
user’s lifetime for Conspiracy are, respectively, 6651 and 5161 hours.
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Fig. 2. User’s lifetime. Empirical CCDF of user’s lifetime (in hours) – i.e. the time
interval between the first and the last like of each polarized user in the category which
he belongs to.
These results show that information belonging to different narratives are
consumed in a similar way by they respective users.
3.2 Engagement in narratives and responsivity to external
information
We continue our analysis by addressing the relationship between the exposition
to external information and the level of engagement of a user on his/her preferred
narrative. We assume as a good indicator of the user engagement within a given
narrative the total number of likes posts. We test the response of polarized users
of both categories to two different kind of information external to their narra-
tives. We use information coming from hoaxbusters pages aiming at debunking
and correcting the diffusion of false claims (mainly conspiracy theses) such as
the link between vaccines and autism or the astonishing medical powers of sour-
sop – and troll pages intentionally posting satirical and demential imitations of
conspiracy theses. Such a selection is peculiar for our analysis as it accounts for
the polarization of debates between consumers of scientific news (supporters of
rational thinking) and conspiracists that have been proved to be less rational
and more prone to avoid scrutiny [36,37,38]. In particular, we analyze how the
activity (comments and likes) of polarized users on troll pages and debunking
pages changes as a function of θ – i.e. the engagement degree, intended as the
number of likes of a polarized user in the category which he/she belongs to. In
Figure 3 we show the number of polarized users as function of the threshold θ.
The two curves show a similar decreasing trend.
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Fig. 3. Users Engagement. Number of polarized users as a function of the engage-
ment degree θ.
In Figure 4 we show the activity (number of likes and comments) of polarized
users of scientific and conspiracy news on respectively, 4,502 debunking (panel
a) and 4709 troll (panel b) information as a function of the user engagement
θ on their related narrative. On the one hand, consumers of scientific news are
more active in liking and commenting debunking posts. On the other hand,
consumers of conspiracist posts are more prone to like (and not to comment)
satirical imitation of the story they are usually exposed to. Such a trend of
polarized users increases with their level of commitment and engagement (for
the effective number of users refer to Figure 3).
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(b) Hoaxbusters
Fig. 4. Users on external contents. Users activity (likes and comments) as a func-
tion of the engagement degree θ of conspiracy and scientific news on troll (panel a) and
hoaxbusters (panel b) posts.
The results of Figure 4 suggest that conspiracists are interested in diffusing
their stories; their tendency to avoid scrutiny allows for the mixing of conspir-
acy news and their satirical imitation, pointing out the high credulity level of
consumers of conspiracy-related information. On the other hand, also polarized
users of scientific news tend to like and comment information that are consistent
with their narratives (debunking of unsubstantiated claims). Such results are a
warning on the effectiveness of online debunking activities since they are mainly
fruited by users of scientific pages and are not considered by consumers of con-
spiracy information. Coherently with [5], high levels of commitment in conspiracy
theses decrease the level of interest in official and main stream information and
increases the possibility to interact with unsubstantiated rumors.
3.3 Conspiracy news within online debunking and trolls
Information consumption is driven by the user’s system of beliefs. Hence, infor-
mation aimed at contrasting the diffusion of unsubstantiated claims – i.e. mainly
targeting the debunking of conspiracy rumors – are almost ignored by conspir-
acists. However, the interaction between conspiracists and debunkers posts might
occur. We test the effect on usual consumers of conspiracy news to the exposure
to debunker posts. In particular, we want to understand if these posts are effec-
tive in changing the tendency of users to interact with unsubstantiated claims. To
do this we measure the survival probability of conspiracy users who commented
(active interaction) either posts from debunking pages or false information as a
function of the level of user engagement θ in interacting with conspiracy news.
Focusing on the persistence of polarized users on posts of their category we esti-
mate their survival probability function. More precisely, we compute the proba-
bility that a user’s lifetime – i.e. the temporal distance between the first and the
last like of the user in the category which he belongs to – is greater than some
specified temporal distance t. Let define the random variable T with cumulative
distribution function F (t) on the interval [0,∞). Then the probability that a
user’s lifetime is not greater than a specific t is given by the cumulative proba-
bility distribution F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t). Hence, the survival function is the proba-
bility that a user will continue to like posts supporting the narrative in which he
is polarized on beyond a given time t given by S(t) = Pr(T > t) = 1− F (t). To
compute such a measure we use the Kaplan Meier estimate [39]. Let nt denote
the number of users that are still liking posts supporting the narratives in which
they are polarized on, just before time t; and let dt denote the number of users
that stop liking at time t. Then the estimated survival probability after time t is
(nt−dt)/nt. Assuming that the times t are independent, the Kaplan Meier esti-
mate of the survival function at time t is defined by Sˆ(t) =
∏t (nt−dt
nt
)
. Figure
5 shows in panel (a) the quantile discretization, for different levels of engagement
θ, of the survival probability distribution of usual consumers of conspiracy news
which interacted with troll posts; and in panel (b), as a control, the quantile
discretization, for different levels of engagement θ, of the survival probability
distribution of polarized users not exposed to intentional false claims. Figure
6 shows the quantile discretization of the survival probability for conspiracists
exposed and not exposed to satirical and false information at different levels of
engagement, i.e. θ = 10 and θ = 450. For consumers of conspiracy news not
exposed to troll memes, the probability to remain polarized is constant with the
increase of their level of commitment. Conversely, the more a user is engaged,
the more a contact with a troll post will reinforce the probability to remain a
polarized user in his category.
Fig. 5. Survival probability of conspiracists exposed to troll posts. Heatmap of
the quantile discretization of the survival probability distribution of conspiracy users
against their level of engagement θ exposed (panel a) and not exposed (panel b) to
satirical and demential imitation of the story they are usually exposed to.
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Fig. 6. Survival probability of conspiracists exposed to troll posts. Quantile
discretization of the survival probability for conspiracists exposed and not exposed to
satirical and false information at different levels of engagement. We notice a nearly
identical survival probability between exposed and not exposed when the level of en-
gagement is low (θ = 10), whereas when the level of engagement is high (θ = 450)
we find that the survival probability of conspiracists exposed to satirical and false
information is progressively higher with respect to the one of those not exposed.
Similar results hold for the reaction to information having the goal to per-
suade users of the unsubstantiated nature of conspiracy thesis. Figure 7 shows
the quantile discretization of the survival probability distribution for increas-
ing level of users engagement θ of usual consumers of conspiracy news exposed
(panel a) and not exposed (panel b) to debunking memes. Figure 8 shows the
quantile discretization of the survival probability for conspiracists exposed and
not exposed to debunking posts at different levels of engagement, i.e. θ = 10 and
θ = 450. For consumers of conspiracy news not exposed to debunking memes,
the probability to remain polarized is constant with the increase of their level of
commitment. Conversely, the more a user is engaged, the more a contact with
a debunking post will reinforce the probability to remain a polarized user in his
category.
Fig. 7. Survival probability of conspiracists exposed to debunking posts.
Quantile discretization of the survival probability distribution of conspiracy users
against their level of engagement θ exposed (panel a) and not exposed (panel b) to
posts debunking conspiracy theses.
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Fig. 8. Survival probability of conspiracists exposed to debunking posts.
Quantile discretization of the survival probability for conspiracists exposed and not
exposed to posts debunking conspiracy theses at different levels of engagement. We
notice a nearly identical survival probability between exposed and not exposed when
the level of engagement is low (θ = 10), whereas when the level of engagement is high
(θ = 450) we find that the survival probability of conspiracists exposed to debunking
posts is progressively higher than the not exposed.
These results suggest that the more a user is committed in consuming conspir-
acy related information, the more the injection of either satirical or debunking
posts will increase the probability to continue consuming conspiracy stories. Ei-
ther contrasting or making fool of biased narratives might create an unwanted
reinforcement and burst on the diffusion of conspiracy theses and unsubstanti-
ated rumors fostering the formation of biased beliefs.
4 Conclusions and future works
Conspiracy theories as alternative explanations to complex phenomena (e.g.
globalization) find on the Web a natural medium for their dissemination and,
not rarely, are used as argumentation for policy making. We measure the effect
of the exposition to intentional false claims (satirical and demential version of
conspiracy theses) and to debunk memes (information aiming at correcting the
diffusion of false claims) for increasing level of user commitment on the pre-
ferred narrative. Our results show the exposure to both claims and debunking
might reinforce the probability to interact again with conspiracist stories. As
a benchmark, we use information coming from debunking pages, namely hoax-
busters – i.e. pages aiming at correcting the diffusion of false claims such as the
link between vaccines and autism, or the global warming caused by chemtrails
– and troll pages intentionally posting satirical and demential imitation of con-
spiracy theses. In the next future we aim at exploring the potential implication
of the friendship network structure in the creation, diffusion and reinforcement
of narratives.
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